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ABSTRACT
This paper problematizes the ways in which the policy process is conceived in published
psychological research. It argues that these conceptions of the policy process fail to ade-
quately reﬂect the real-world dynamism and complexity of the processes and practices of
social policy-making and implementation. In this context, psychological evidence needs to be
seen as one type of evidence (amongst many others). In turn this requires researchers to take
account of broader political processes that favour certain types of knowledge and disparage
others. Rather than be regarded as objective and scientiﬁc, policy in this characterisation is
regarded as a motivated form of politics. This multi-layered, multi-level hybrid structure is not
immediately amenable to the well-intentioned interventions of psychologists. While the
tendency of many psychologists is to overestimate the impact that we can have upon policy
formation and implementation, there are examples where psychological theory and research
has fed directly into UK policy developments in recent years. This paper draws on the recent
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) initiative and the work of personality
researcher Adam Perkins on the UK’s social security system to ask whether psychology has a
sufﬁciently elaborated sense of its own evidence base to legitimately seek to inﬂuence key
national areas of public policy. The article cautions against dramatic changes to policy pre-
dicated upon any one reading of the variegated and, at times, contradictory psychological
evidence base. It concludes that, in order to meaningfully contribute to the policy develop-
ment process in a way which increases equality and social justice, psychologists need to be
more strategic in thinking about how their research is likely to be represented and mis-
represented in any particular context. Finally some possible directions for psychologists to
take for a more meaningful relationship with policy are suggested.
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Representations of policy in psychological research
The original ‘scientist of happiness’ Jeremy Bentham iscommonly regarded as the individual who, more than anyother, brought the phenomenon of ‘evidence based policy
making’ into being. The sociologist Will Davies states that,
“Whenever a policy is evaluated for its measurable outcomes, or
assessed for its efﬁciency using cost beneﬁt analysis, Bentham’s
inﬂuence is present.” (2015). It is important to bear this inﬂuence
in mind therefore, when almost 250 years later, the discipline of
psychology (via the ‘measurement’ of human experience), is
aiming to stake a claim for a central role at the heart of the UK
policy agenda.
At issue here is the way in which much academic research, and
psychological research in particular, conceives of, and engages
with, policy processes. Typically, this involves a naïve reading of
policy context (which happens somewhere else, away from the
disciplinary context of the research) which is painted as uni-
dimensional and something that can be relatively easily inﬂu-
enced, with no need to address questions of complexity, or other
disciplinary and professional boundaries. The assumption tends
to be that policy should come to their research, rather than
thinking (concretely) about how they, themselves, not some
ghostly, ill-deﬁned (and supplicant) policy actor, might make
their research policy relevant for them. This fundamental lack of
connection with existing policy processes, demonstrates as Cair-
ney (2016) has argued, that researchers are engaging with the
policy process that they wish existed rather than the processes
which actually exists. The policy processes which do exist are
predicated upon internal and external hierarchies of evidence,
and processes and practices of inﬂuence, patronage and lobbying
which are far removed from two throw away lines in the con-
clusion of an academic paper stating that the preceding research
has policy relevance and impelling policy makers to sit up and
take notice (whomsoever those policymakers might be-they are
seldom if ever identiﬁed). This is to say nothing of the wider
ideologically framed political and discursive formations that
inﬂuence what it is possible to imagine in a policy arena at any
one place or time.
To illustrate this complexity, and the attendant constraints
upon psychological research impacting upon the policy process,
we take an example where psychological research has been
adopted in a highly selective way; the development of psycholo-
gical treatments for common mental health issues. Our argument
is that, in order to meaningfully contribute to the policy devel-
opment process in a way which increases equality and social
justice, psychologists need to be more strategic in thinking about
how their research is likely to be represented and misrepresented
in any particular context. This requires a political awareness and
engagement that historically psychologists, in the interests of
scientiﬁc distance, have been wary of.
In terms of the political context, the ghost of utilitarianism
looms large. A rigid hierarchy of evidence, primarily predicated
upon questions of economic value (broadly construed), dom-
inates the ﬁeld (Cairney, 2016). Even then, even if the paper has
the highest standard of evidence, this does not necessarily guar-
antee that this evidence will be picked up by policy makers or
politicians. If there is no political case for the policy, there will be
little chance of the evidence being implemented in a policy
context. The point is that demonstrating economic value is not
enough, there is also a clear and present need to demonstrate the
political expediency of any proposed policy, (regardless of the
evidence). It is in this context that we see policy-based evidence,
rather than evidence based policy (see Cairney, 2018), where
policymakers may make very selective use of the evidence in a
way that supports their view and denigrates another view. Con-
sider the implications of this dynamic process for an academic
paper which claims policy relevance, but does not direct this to a
when or a where. In this context the academic research could, it is
argued, be up for grabs, ready and able to deployed in any
number of ways, that may, or may not contradict the intention of
the original research.
Earlier we argued that this insistence, on the part of psychol-
ogists, reﬂects a naïve reading of the policy context. Furthermore,
this failure to engage with the dynamic complexity of policy
practices and processes runs the risk of reifying this mis-
characterisation. Such is the vagaries and iniquities of the policy
process that there is a need to acknowledge and address these
vagaries if research is to have a meaningful and signiﬁcant impact.
There is a compelling evidence that outlines the way that policies
are often driven by ideology and biases rather than evidence
(Fishbeyn, 2015, Prinja, 2010). Cleary then, there is a danger that
psychological research, which argued position X, can and will be
taken up by politicians or policy makers and deployed in a way
which argues position Y. And, if the characterisation of the policy
process envisaged by researchers is the reiﬁed mischaracterisation
we outline above, the danger of this misrepresentation of the tone
and tenor of academic research becomes far more likely to occur,
as policy makers and politicians assert their dominance (over the
evidence makers, i.e., academic researchers) in the policy arena.
All of this talk relates to issues in and around the policy pro-
cess, that is to say, the practice of social policy, how it works. But
there is also a need to address issues of context, those social,
political, economic and cultural spheres where the practice of
social policy is enacted. There is a clear need to conceive of the
relation between these different spheres in terms of the inﬂuence
and impact that psychology might have on policy process and
practice, but also, in terms of the inﬂuence and impact that policy
might have on psychology. Failure to consider this ‘to-and fro’, or
‘ebb and ﬂow’ would run as much of a risk of policymakers
reifying psychological research as the obverse process we set out
here.
This requires psychologists, as a professional group, to give
serious discussion and debate to what they are doing in a broader
social, political economic and cultural context. It requires psy-
chologists to raise questions about how they should (or should
not) contribute to policy. Moreover, questions about the relia-
bility of the psychological evidence base, as well as a tendency to
celebrate the statistical ﬂukes left standing after researchers have
cast around to ﬁnd publishable positive results (Rhodes, 2015)
has left psychologists Farsides and Sparks (2015) to suggest that
‘psychology is liberally sprayed with bullshit’ (p368).
IAPT, the welfare trait and ‘policy-ready’ psychology
While the tendency of many psychologists is to overestimate the
impact that we can have upon policy formation and imple-
mentation, there are examples where psychological theory and
research has fed directly into UK policy developments in recent
years, with some inﬂuence. By focusing on a high proﬁle example
we can then examine not only if psychology has an impact but
more importantly what that impact has been.
The Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT)
initiative is arguably the jewel in the crown of applied psychol-
ogy’s inﬂuence on UK mental health policy, with the rest of the
world taking note (NYT, 2017). Based on an elegant economic
cost-saving calculation (the ghost of Bentham again), by the UKs
‘Happiness Tsar’ and economist Richard Layard, combined with
evidence-based psychological therapies (primarily CBT), one
could reasonably ask what’s not to like? While we of course can
see the value in the opportunity for many thousands of people to
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undertake a course of psychological therapy to alleviate their
mental health issues and to bring an important psychosocial
dimension into mainstream mental health care, there are unin-
tended and unhelpful consequences of the IAPT agenda that need
to be considered.
Firstly, as with many policy initiatives, there is the gap between
the political rhetoric and the clinical reality. IAPT has, from the
beginning, made ambitious claims about its effectiveness, offering
treatment to 900,000 patients annually and achieving a 50%
recovery rate for depression, anxiety and related ‘common mental
health problems.’ (Clark, 2011). It should be borne in mind that this
level of treatment was necessitated in order to produce the ‘zero net
cost’ of IAPT at the policy development stage through promising
savings in physical health care, numbers of welfare claimants and a
reduction in mental health related sick days (Clark, 2011).
Whilst IAPT has lived up to some of these promises, with
undoubted successes in treatment effectiveness (recovery ﬁgures
approaching 50% for those who complete treatment, NHS Digital,
2017), there is some cause for concern around evidence that the
‘IAPT effect’ has not been entirely benign. For example, in IAPT
monthly data summary for December 2017 NHS data (NHS
Digital, 2017), 89,485 new referrals were received with 68,205
referrals entering treatment. Of this number 39,834 completed a
course of treatment with 37,238 starting treatment with ‘caseness’
(the referral has enough symptoms to be regarded as clinical) and
49.9% of those approaching recovery by the end of treatment.
This data means that only 22.25% of the total referrals were
considered to be getting better. That means that in this month
over 72% of referrals coming for help either did not receive any
treatment at all, did not receive a full course of treatment or did
not get better by IAPT’s own metrics.
If we are more conservative and remove those who did not
start treatment from our calculation, the situation improves
slightly to 27% of referrals achieving recovery and even if we
assume that one referral does not equate to one person, that is still
a lot of disappointed, disillusioned and worried people. Given that
these dropout ﬁgures are roughly comparable with other time
points in IAPT’s history (McInnes, 2014) this is cause for con-
cern. Add to this the study which found that, for a sample who
did achieve recovery using low intensity forms of IAPT, 53%
relapsed within one year (Ali et al., 2017) and we can see that the
more carefully we look at the psychological evidence base for
IAPT policy the more questions arise.
Given widespread reductions to specialist mental health ser-
vices, it seems likely that IAPT, a brief, often self-directed form of
psychological treatment for mild to moderate mental health issues
is being expected to plug the gap left by the reduction in longer
term community services. As Watts (2016) points out, in IAPT’s
own analysis dropout ﬁgures are not seen as a criticism of the
initiative itself as they are not counted in recovery ﬁgures. Fur-
thermore, in trying to bring people into services in order to meet
policy-based treatment targets we may inadvertently be creating
need in people and then not meeting it, a particularly ‘perverse
form of care’ likely to have a detrimental impact on the mental
health of many left behind by the IAPT revolution.
Additional evidence demonstrates that the number of people
not recovering through IAPT approved CBT are dis-
proportionately from poorer communities (Delgadillo et al., 2015).
In the 2015–2016 IAPT annual report (NHS Digital, 2016), 55% of
referrals in the least deprived 10% of areas achieved recovery,
while in the most deprived 10% of areas only 35% achieved
recovery. This can be likened to an extension of the ‘inverse care
law’ whereby not only do people in more disadvantaged com-
munities struggle more to get access to healthcare, when they do it
is less effective in helping their mental health. To what extent this
is a failing of IAPT per se and how much it reﬂects the causes of
common mental health issues in disadvantaged communities
being less psychological and more social (Speed and Taggart,
2012) is beyond the scope of this paper but is also worth con-
sidering when assessing psychology’s readiness to take an
intrapsychic perspective to the exclusion of other models.
From this we can begin to see that laudable claims of treating
common mental health issues for hundreds of thousands of people
annually involves unintended consequences of alienating many
from trusting services and repeating the pattern of further mar-
ginalising those already structurally disadvantaged. Indeed, it is our
argument that it is the very ‘policy ready’ nature of IAPT that has
precipitated many of these unintended consequences. Its grand,
possibly hubristic vision of ‘curing’ common mental health issues
and reducing the economic burden of the ‘mentally ill’ undoubtedly
plays well in a political era that privileges an instrumentalist, Fordist
and market-oriented approach to public services, but the scale of
the claims needed to provide a ‘bottom line’ appeal was always
likely to demand much and leave many staff and patients behind.
This is largely because Benthamite cost-beneﬁt analyses are not a
sufﬁcient basis upon which to predicate the policy and practice of
mental health care because they ignore the processes and contexts
of mental health, out there, in the world.
Another source of ‘policy-ready’ psychological research comes
from the personality researcher Adam Perkins in his work ‘The
Welfare Trait’ (2015). Perkins makes a case for a fundamental
restructuring of the UK’s social security system based on an
assertion that overly generous welfare provision for out-of-work
parents results in the proliferation of what he describes as an
‘Employment Resistant Personality’ proﬁle that leads to welfare
claimants having more children and negatively impacting
national productivity. Whilst questions have been raised about
whether this work is of merit as psychological science, the issue
we want to address here is whether psychology has a sufﬁciently
elaborated sense of its own evidence base to seek to inﬂuence a
key national area of public policy as social security?
To take the Welfare Trait example, even Perkins notes the
perverse logic in cutting welfare payments for families with
multiple children, thereby depriving already disadvantaged chil-
dren of resources. On this point there is a consensus of agree-
ment. However, Perkins draws from a 1975 study (Tonge et al.
1975) of 33 Shefﬁeld families to suggest that this perverse logic
can be ignored as welfare claimants all “spend their welfare
beneﬁts on unnecessary purchases such as electronic gadgets and
luxury chocolates, instead of using the money to improve the lives
of their children.” (Perkins, 2015 p.177). This conclusion seems
emotive and polemical rather than being based on any robust
evidence. This conclusion on the part of Perkins is clearly not the
type of psychological evidence that we want to use to determine
the life chances of millions of children.
When we add a competing example of psychological evidence,
an analysis which found that levels of referral for maltreatment
were causally related to the income variation in low income
families in the US (Cancian et al. 2010) with reductions in income
leading to an increases in maltreatment cases, we can see that
dramatic changes to welfare policy predicated upon any one
reading of the variegated and at times contradictory psychological
evidence base can be downright dangerous.
Concluding thoughts
We would like to end by urging caution on psychologists who aim
to have a ‘policy impact’. Instead, we suggest a level of professional
engagement in policy processes, whereby psychological evidence is
used to forge alliances with common interest groups, for example,
to lobby ministers for particular reforms or new initiatives. So
rather than merely referencing policy implications in research
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papers, there is a wider social undertaking to make research evi-
dence available to communities impacted by the social problems
under investigation in order to enable them to petition for change.
In some mental health research contexts this is already hap-
pening, where alliances have been formed between psychological
researchers and mental health service user groups. In the
Understanding Psychosis (2014) project there is a clear move
towards the dissemination of research ﬁndings regarding aetiol-
ogy, symptomatology and treatment for psychoses and associated
mental health issues that largely draws upon preexisting psy-
chological research alongside ﬁrst person testimonies and acti-
vism from people with that diagnosis. Therefore, in this case the
research acts as a form of social activism in which evidence is
used explicitly in the interests of those it purports to be about,
allowing them a very real, present and active voice in talk about
their mental health. However, there is a bind that comes with this
‘bottom up’ approach to inﬂuence, and it is one that resonates
with the naivety (even futility) of claims regarding the policy
relevance of psychological research that we critiqued in this
paper. Unless there is a vested interest policy actor working with
the psychological researchers, the chance of any research gaining
any degree of purchase in the ﬁeld is at best limited.
The great achievement of the IAPT agenda was the alignment of
psychological evidence, the vested interests of the profession of
clinical psychology wanting to expand its sphere of inﬂuence in an
historically medically dominated ﬁeld with the social democratic,
utilitarian ethos of a key policy inﬂuencer in Richard Layard. This
placed psychology and its practitioners in a position of previously
unimaginable inﬂuence within mental health service development in
the NHS, with the opportunity for future mission creep into other
areas. But, to return to Cairney (2018), this was largely because the
psychological evidence corresponded to the policy reality (i.e., for
IAPT, psychology was able to present policy-based evidence, rather
than IAPT being drawn from evidence-based policy). As such, its
policy inﬂuence had material, resource-based advantages in a way
that alignment with the service user movement will not, because, it is
much more unlikely that service user based evidence is going to
align so comfortably with the evidentiary needs of policy makers,
psychiatrists or psychologists (and once we move to consider the
psy-professions, we are already one degree removed from inﬂuen-
cing policy processes). So, in order for psychological evidence to be
utilised by community stakeholders, it may have to risk being
‘sidelined’ in other forums. This question is as much ethical as
scientiﬁc and will confront psychologists trying to inﬂuence policy
with the challenging question, what are the implications of this
evidence not for policy but for the communities many of us are paid
to serve? As we have argued in this paper, this question is less
straightforward than we might like to think.
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